Müslümanlar Kur’ân’ın ilk emri olan okumayı sadece yüzeysel bir okuma değil varlığın özüne inmek ve dünyayı anlamak olarak değerlendirmişlerdir. Bu doğrultuda ilk zamanlardan itibaren etraflarında gelişen tüm olayları ibret nazarıyla incelemişler ve ilmî çalışmalarına konu etmişlerdir. İlim öğrenmenin kadın veya erkek fark etmeksizin tüm Müslümanlar için gerekli görülmesi de onlar için önemli bir motivasyon kaynağı olmuştur. Hızlı ve emin adımlarla yükselen İslam medeniyetinin öne çıkan yönlerinden birisi Müslümanların dini ilimlere gösterdikleri ilgidir. Sadece dini ilimlerle sınırlı kalmayan Müslümanlar sonraki dönemlerde astronomi, (...) matematik, geometri, fizik ve kimya gibi pozitif bilimlere de ilgi göstermişlerdir. Müslümanların bu alana gösterdiği ilginin farklı sebeplerinden birisi Kur'an'da gök cisimleri ve yaratılış gibi hususların yer almasıdır. Ayrıca rutin ibadetlerin vakitlerinin tayininde ay, güneş vb. gök cisimlerinin hareketlerinin esas alınması gibi hususlar Müslümanlarda büyük ilgi ve merak uyandırmıştır. Diğer taraftan fetihlerle birlikte çok geniş bir coğrafyaya yayılan Müslümanlar buralarda farklı etnik, dini ve kültürel unsurlarla karşılaşmışlardır. Kendileri için önemli bir aşama teşkil eden ve bu unsurların sağlayacağı muhtemel faydaları görmezden gelmeyen Müslümanlar, insanlık mirası olarak değerlendirdikleri bilimsel çalışmaları kendi dillerine tercüme etmeye başlamışlardır. Bu faaliyetlerin devlet yetkilileri tarafından da desteklenmesi ile birlikte çalışmaların daha da arttığı görülmektedir. Çalışmamızın temel amaçlarından biri İslam dünyasının fetihlerle birlikte siyasî ve askerî gelişmelerden sonra ilmî çalışmalarda elde ettiği başarısının sebeplerine dair bir değerlendirme yapmaktır. İslam toplumu ilk dönemlerden itibaren öncelikle dini konuların öğrenilmesine ağırlık vermiş, sonrasında ise karşılaştığı diğer medeniyetlerden de etkilenerek pozitif bilimlerle meşgul olmaya başlamıştır. Bu alanlarla ilgili genellikle herhangi bir sınırlamaya bağlı kalmamışlardır. İslâm’ın ilk yıllarında pozitif bilimlere hasredilmiş çalışmalar olmadığı görülse de ilk hicrî yüzyılın sonlarına doğru bu anlamda önemli çalışmalar ortaya çıkmıştır. Müslümanlar öncelikle dinlerini daha iyi anlamaya çalışmışlar, bu konuda belli bir birikim elde ettikten sonra özellikle Abbâsîler (750-1258) döneminde pozitif bilimlere ilgi duymuşlar ve 4/10. yüzyıla gelindiğinde bu alanlarda büyük eserler vermeye başlamışlardır. Çalışmamızda öncelikle Müslümanların yaptığı çalışmalara ilişkin güncel ve klasik kaynaklarda yer alan bilgiler bir araya getirilerek yüzyıllar içerisinde yaşanan değişim ele alınacaktır. Esasında bugün Müslümanların içerisinde bulunduğu durumun çözümü de kısmen bu dönemin daha iyi anlaşılmasında gizlidir. Tarihleri boyunca Müslümanların yaşadıkları bu yükseliş serüvenini anlamak günümüze de önemli ölçüde ışık tutacaktır. (shrink)

Nikolai Zhinkin’s review of Ernst Cassirer is so far the earliest document of the discussion in Russia about Cassirer’s conception of myth and his theory of symbolic forms. The text is published from Zhinkin’s archive. Zhinkin here notes a reorientation of Neo-Kantianism that reveals its hidden relativism and stands as a symptom of its downfall.

The Nikolais/Louis Dance Technique provides the definite resource for understanding and practicing the influential dance technique developed by two pioneers of modern dance, Alwin Nikolais and Murray Louis. The Nikolais/Louis technique is presented in a week-to-week classroom manual, providing an indispensable tool for teachers and students of this widely studied movement practice. Theoretical background for further reading is set off from the manual for those interested in deeper study. Their philosophy and methodology span a broad readership and offer an important (...) addition to dance literature and American cultural history. (shrink)

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This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky’s “Tpaнcцeндeнтaльнo-фeнoмeнoлoгичecкiй идeaлизмъ Гyccepля”, published in the émigré journal Пyть in 1939. In this article, Lossky presents and criticizes Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Like many successors of Husserl’s “Göttingen School,” Lossky interprets Husserl’s transcendental idealism as a Neo-Kantian idealism and he criticizes it on the ground that it leads to a form of solipsism. In light of his own epistemology and his metaphysical system, he also claims that, although Husserl is (...) more radical than Descartes in his methodological doubt, he is not radical enough, because his abstention from existential judgment with regard to the external world is itself an existential judgment. In this regard, Lossky affirms that his own critically-informed defense of naive realism is in fact more radical than Husserl’s transcendental idealism. (shrink)

The Russian philosopher Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky considered himself a Leibnizian of sorts. He accepted parts of Leibniz’s doctrine of monads, although he preferred to call them ‘substantival agents’ and rejected the thesis that they have neither doors nor windows. In Lossky’s own doctrine, monads have existed since the beginning of time, they are immortal, and can evolve or devolve depending on the goodness or badness of their behavior. Such evolution requires the possibility for monads to reincarnate into the bodies of (...) creatures of a higher level on the scala perfectionis. According to this theory, a monad can evolve by being progressively reincarnated multiple times through a sort of process of metamorphosis from the level of the most elementary particles all the way up to the level of human beings or even higher. Lossky argues that the works of Leibniz contain scattered elements of such a systematic doctrine of reincarnation. He attempts to reconstitute this doctrine in an article that appeared both in Russian and German in 1931. The Russian version, ‘Ученiе Лейбница о перевоплощенiи какъ метаморфозѣ’, was published in the Сборникъ Русскаго института въ Прагѣ, vol. 2, 1931, pp. 77–88. The German version appeared under the title ‘Leibniz’ Lehre von der Reinkarnation als Metamorphose,’ in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 40, n. 2, 1931, pp. 214–226. The content of the Russian and German versions is roughly the same, except for the omission, in the German version, of a mention of David Hume in the second sentence and of one paragraph and a half at the end of the article. The following is a translation of this article. I translated the text from the Russian version, which was in all appearances written first, but I also took the German version into account. The original pagination is added in angle brackets. Angle brackets are used wherever the additions are mine. — Frédéric Tremblay. (shrink)

This is a translation from the Russian of Nikolai Lossky’s review of Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932). The review was published in the Parisian émigré journal Новый Град (Cité nouvelle) in 1932. In this review, Lossky criticizes Bergson for leaving some key problems of the philosophy of religion unresolved, namely that of God’s relation to the world (theism vs. pantheism), that of immortality, as well as that of evil. He also criticizes Bergson’s (...) “extreme biologism” in his explanation of morality, which, in his view, subjectivizes the objects of religion. For Lossky, the symbolic images of the Christian religion are not subjective “fabulations,” but real symbols through which God reveals himself to us. Likewise, according to Lossky, true morality cannot be explained in terms of biological adaptation, but must rely on the foundation of an objective, i.e., Platonic, axiological sphere. (Frédéric Tremblay). (shrink)

This is a translation from the Russian of Nikolai Lossky’s “Heдocтaтки гнoceoлoгiи Бepгcoнa и влiянie иxъ нa eгo мeтaфизикy” (The Defects of Bergson’s Epistemology and Their Consequences on His Metaphysics), which was published in the journal Boпpocы филocoфiи и пcиxoлoгiи (Questions of Philosophy and Psychology) in 1913. In this article, Lossky criticizes Bergson’s epistemological dualism, which completely separates intuition from reason, and which rejects reason in favor of intuition. For Bergson, reality is continuous, indivisible, fluid, etc., and reason distorts it (...) through its acts of division, abstraction, extraction, and so on. Lossky argues that this conclusion does not follow. Reason does not distort the living flow of reality; it rather provides a window unto aspects of the otherwise undivided seamless flowing organic whole. In fact, reason is itself a species of intuition in its own right, namely an intellectual intuition, the object of which is the atemporal facet of the world (the Platonic ideal realm), which is necessary for the existence of its temporal facet. Lossky thus challenges Bergson’s one-sided and self-defeating reduction of being to a flux of changes devoid of changing things. (Frédéric Tremblay). (shrink)

Despite its short historical moment in the sun, behaviorism has become something akin to a theoria non grata, a position that dare not be explicitly endorsed. The reasons for this are complex, of course, and they include sociological factors which we cannot consider here, but to put it briefly: many have doubted the ambition to establish law-like relationships between mental states and behavior that dispense with any sort of mentalistic or intentional idiom, judging that explanations of intelligent behavior require reference (...) to qualia and/or mental events. Today, when behaviorism is discussed at all, it is usually in a negative manner, either as an attempt to discredit an opponent’s view via a reductio, or by enabling a position to distinguish its identity and positive claims by reference to what it is (allegedly) not. In this paper, however, we argue that the ghost of behaviorism is present in influential, contemporary work in the field of embodied and enactive cognition, and even in aspects of the phenomenological tradition that these theorists draw on. Rather than take this to be a problem for these views as some have, we argue that once the behaviorist dimensions are clarified and distinguished from the straw-man version of the view, it is in fact an asset, one which will help with task of setting forth a scientifically reputable version of enactivism and/or philosophical behaviorism that is nonetheless not brain-centric but behavior-centric. While this is a bit like “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” strategy, as Shaun Gallagher notes (2019), with the shared enemy of behaviorism and enactivism being classical Cartesian views and/or orthodox cognitivism in its various guises, the task of this paper is to render this alliance philosophically plausible. Doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02432-1. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

This article is a study of the compatibility of the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism and Orthodox Christianity. The great importance of this topic is due to its direct connection with the improvement of society and the ongoing controversy on this issue with attempts to integrate communism with Christianity. The work provides a historical and theological analysis based on a critical study of the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, their associates, historical and theological works, as well as historical documents (...) on this issue. The article examines the approaches of the teachings of Orthodox Christianity, as well as Marxism-Leninism to atheism, materialism, religion and the Church. For this purpose, the relevant texts of Holy Scripture, the opinions of the Church fathers and the views of the founders and followers of Marxism-Leninism are studied. The novelty of this study is that some documents are considered for the first time in the context of the problem under study. In addition, a more detailed and systematic historical and theological analysis of the comparison of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and Orthodox Christianity on this topic is carried out in comparison with the available works. The purpose of the work is to study historical and theological works, as well as historical documents related to the problem under study. The article concludes that Marxism-Leninism in this matter is not compatible with Christianity and is directly opposed to it. Since the Second World War in the USSR, relations between the state and the Church have improved from time to time, but the official state course on Marxism-Leninism did not leave the possibility of their reconciliation. Currently, there are attempts to produce a symbiosis of these two teachings. Many Communists have a positive attitude towards the Church, so a dialogue between them is possible and necessary. But as long as the ideology of the Communists remains Marxism-Leninism, antagonistic to Christianity and any religion in general, in their ranks will always remain hostile to religion. Therefore, the synthesis of these teachings is impossible. (shrink)

This is a translation from Bulgarian into English of Nikolai Lossky’s “Razlichniiat smisul na dumata intuitsiia” (“The Different Senses of the Word Intuition”), published in the Sofianite journal Filosofski pregled (Philosophical Review), 1931, year III, book 1, pp. 1–9. In this article, solicited by the journal’s editor-in-chief, the Bulgarian philosopher Dimitar Mihalchev, Lossky surveys the different ways in which the word “intuition” (intuitsiia) has been used throughout the history of philosophy: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Friedrich Jacobi, Ivan Kireevski, Alexei Khomyakov, (...) Vladimir Solovyov, Bergson, Husserl, and Hans Driesch. Lossky then situates his own use of the word within this philosophical tradition and compares his intuitivism with gnoseologies similar to his own, namely, those of Semyon Frank, Johannes Rehmke, Max Scheler, Paul Linke, Dimitar Mihalchev, the English realists (Samuel Alexander and John Laird), the American realists (Edwin Holt, Walter Marvin, William Montague, Ralph Perry, Walter Pitkin, and Edward Spaulding), and the Neo-Scholastic Josef Gredt. As such, the article makes a valuable addendum to his Obosnovanie intuitivizma (The Foundation of Intuitivism) (1906) and provides a helpful synopsis of his theory of knowledge, which, in accordance with the Russian terminological tradition, he calls “gnoseology”. (shrink)

The article investigates the peculiarities of Durer's aesthetic views in the context of Renaissance philosophy and the theory of cognition of Modern times. Its provisions are compared with fragments of texts by L.-B. Alberti, Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael. The semantic interrelationships of Durer's positions with mysticism, pantheism, natural philosophy and empiricism of Modern Times are emphasized. The interrelation of the problem of knowledge with the theme of freedom and beauty is considered in detail. The authors analyze various opinions and ways (...) of comprehending the beautiful, presented in the philosophical constructions of Durer, his concept of "rational knowledge", "scientific ignorance". Special attention is paid to the boundaries of freedom in Durer's representation. The novelty of the research lies in the fact that the presented concept of the evolution of A. Durer's aesthetic views helps to comprehend those contradictory trends that existed in the Renaissance itself. Thus, Durer believed that freedom conditioned by knowledge ends where attempts to transcend nature begin. A necessary condition for freedom is the understanding that the beautiful is relative. From the understanding of the relativity of the beautiful, from the concrete utopian program of its achievement, an imperative grows, meaning denial, the completion of the aesthetics of Rebirth. According to him, the artist should not limit himself to one type, but should be knowledgeable in various ways of depicting all kinds of types. In order to make such an image as is required of him. Thus, the professionalism of the artist, his experience, knowledge, recognition of the power of knowledge and, at the same time, understanding of its relativity – all this, as an achievement of the Renaissance theory of art, loses its meaning. All this is sacrificed to the tastes of employers. (shrink)

The subject of this study is the problem of the failure of attempts by the scientific community to come to a common understanding of what exactly information can be as something encoded into material structures and moved along with them. At the same time, the following aspects of this problem are considered in detail: what is the immediate cause of the information problem; what are the objective and subjective prerequisites for its appearance; why the unresolved nature of this problem does (...) not interfere with the creation and development of communication systems, control and other "smart" devices; is there any general guideline for finding solutions to such problems, and what is it; what role did the philosophy of information play in turning the problem of information from a private scientific problem into a problem of the ideological level. The main results of the conducted research are as follows: the immediate cause of the information problem has been identified and a comprehensively substantiated solution to this problem has been given; it has been revealed that the incompleteness of the materialistic theory of cognition has become a fertile ground for the appearance of this problem; the circumstances that prevented its completion have been identified; the natural mechanism of control and cognition has been revealed, as a result of which the materialistic theory of cognition has been further developed the source of the ideal in the material world is revealed; it is shown that the mechanistic idea of information coding made the concept of information incompatible with the presence of any objective content; it is revealed what is actually hidden behind the words about information coding and its measurement; the nature of signals and signs is revealed; a kind of bias of the philosophy of information and a general error is revealed all known concepts of information. (shrink)

First published in English in 1935, this is a vital and stimulating critical appraisal of contemporary thought in the post-World War One era. Written by a selection of leading Marxist thinkers including Nikolai Bukharin, who would later become one of the most famous victims of Stalin's show trials, this work offers a Marxist critique of contemporary thought relating to philosophy, science and history. The authors all lean towards the view that the general tendency of modern thought is to abandon the (...) historical method and to deny progress, with the conclusion that Marxism was the only historical and progressive outlook in science, philosophy and history in the period following the First World War and the Communist revolution in Russia. A fascinating document of great historical and political interest which offers an invaluable insight into contemporary thought in the Soviet Union of the 1930s. (shrink)

The subject of this study is the special theory of relativity (SRT) by A. Einstein, the debate about which has been going on for more than a hundred years. The aim of the study is to evaluate SRT from the side of whether everything that is discussed in this theory and thus in the new, relativistic physics is possible in nature itself. At the same time, the author pays special attention to three issues: the principle of relativity, the necessary condition (...) for the objectivity of the content of scientific theories and the Einstein style of scientific thinking, which predetermined the ideological component of SRT and all relativistic physics. But such issues as relativistic reductions of lengths and durations, the relativity of simultaneity and a single space-time do not remain without attention. The study revealed the fallacy of a long-standing and widespread opinion about the relativity of properties. The necessary condition for the objectivity of scientific theories is revealed. The natural form of expression of quantities is revealed and the non-relative nature of all natural quantities is shown. The hidden form of relativity inherent in the SRT postulate about the constancy of the speed of light in all inertial reference frames and extended in SRT to the magnitude of all lengths and durations considered in it is revealed. It is shown that such relativity is based on the dependence of the quantities on the choice of their reflection systems. It is shown that such dependence is impossible in nature itself. It is concluded that the SRT is erroneous. At the same time, the factors that served as favorable ground for the emergence and spread of this erroneous theory are listed. (shrink)

There is a view in the literature around beliefs that evidence responsiveness is a necessary feature of beliefs. The reasoning is that because beliefs are governed by truth they must be evidence responsive. A mental state that fails to be evidence responsive, therefore, could not be a belief as it could not be governed by truth. The implication is that even those evidence-resistant mental states that appear to be beliefs are in fact something else. I argue that evidence resistance is (...) a feature of at least some beliefs, so evidence responsiveness cannot be a necessary feature of belief. (shrink)

In their update to Intentionality All-Stars, Hutto and Satne claim that there is currently no satisfactory account for a naturalised conception of content. From this the pair suggest that we need to consider whether content is present in all aspects of intelligence, that is, whether it is content all the way down. Yet if we do not have an acceptable theory of content such a question seems out of place. It seems more appropriate to question whether content itself is the (...) problematic assumption. This paper will explore this question, with the analysis hinging on whether those trying to naturalise content are facing a tough challenge as Haugeland has suggested, or whether it is a genuine dilemma as Hutto has suggested elsewhere. If those attempting to naturalise content are facing a genuine dilemma, a dilemma in which the non-existence of content is one of the horns, then it would seem that the issue is not at what stage you posit content, but whether you should posit content at all. This also has the added benefit of shifting the debate to a more global discussion, that is, the best way to explain intelligence, period. (shrink)

There exist two known types of ultrafilter extensions of first-order models, both in a certain sense canonical. One of them comes from modal logic and universal algebra, and in fact goes back to Jónsson and Tarski :891–939, 1951; 74:127–162, 1952). Another one The infinity project proceeding, Barcelona, 2012) comes from model theory and algebra of ultrafilters, with ultrafilter extensions of semigroups as its main precursor. By a classical fact of general topology, the space of ultrafilters over a discrete space is (...) its largest compactification. The main result of Saveliev The infinity project proceeding, Barcelona, 2012), which confirms a canonicity of this extension, generalizes this fact to discrete spaces endowed with an arbitrary first-order structure. An analogous result for the former type of ultrafilter extensions was obtained in Saveliev. Results of such kind are referred to as extension theorems. After a brief introduction, we offer a uniform approach to both types of extensions based on the idea to extend the extension procedure itself. We propose a generalization of the standard concept of first-order interpretations in which functional and relational symbols are interpreted rather by ultrafilters over sets of functions and relations than by functions and relations themselves, and define ultrafilter models with an appropriate semantics for them. We provide two specific operations which turn ultrafilter models into ordinary models, establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which the latter are the two canonical ultrafilter extensions of some ordinary models, and obtain a topological characterization of ultrafilter models. We generalize a restricted version of the extension theorem to ultrafilter models. To formulate the full version, we propose a wider concept of ultrafilter models with their semantics based on limits of ultrafilters, and show that the former concept can be identified, in a certain way, with a particular case of the latter; moreover, the new concept absorbs the ordinary concept of models. We provide two more specific operations which turn ultrafilter models in the narrow sense into ones in the wide sense, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which ultrafilter models in the wide sense are the images of ones in the narrow sense under these operations, and also are two canonical ultrafilter extensions of some ordinary models. Finally, we establish three full versions of the extension theorem for ultrafilter models in the wide sense. The results of the first three sections of this paper were partially announced in Poliakov and Saveliev On two concepts of ultrafilter extensions of first-order models and their generalizations, Springer, Berlin, 2017). (shrink)